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Aircraft Subsidies
Stephan The United States and the European Union have been fi ghting over aircraft subsidies since 2004. The USA had requested the initiation of WTO dispute settlement proceedings against the EU at the time when Airbus launched the A380 and A350 projects, and when Boeing was about to lose its position as market leader. The EU immediately countersued the USA, resulting in two parallel subsidies cases of a dimension never seen at the WTO. The EU claimed in its fi ling that Boeing had received over US $19.1 billion in illegal subsidies from state, local and federal sources. The consultations and panel proceedings took more than six years whereas average WTO cases are resolved within approximately 22 months.
1 After the decision on Airbus in June 2010, the WTO Panel now ruled that Boeing had received subsidies of at least US $5.3 billion.
2
The views on the WTO ruling diverge on both sides of the Atlantic: the USA and the EU both claimed victory. "This WTO Panel report clearly shows that Boeing has received huge subsidies in the past and continues to receive signifi cant subsidies today. The US began this dispute in 2004 and now fi nds itself with a crystal clear ruling that exposes its long-running multi-billion dollar subsidisation of Boeing through Federal and State programmes as illegal," said EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht.
3 Although the WTO Panel did not uphold all claims by the European • the US Government through prohibited "Foreign Sales Corporation" export subsidies, • the NASA and the US Department of Defense through R&D programmes and general support, and • the States of Washington, Kansas and Illinois through tax breaks and other programmes.
Foreign Sales Corporations
The United States and the European Union had already fought about export-contingent tax benefi ts for American exporters at the WTO between 1997 and 2006 ("Foreign Sales Corporations" Dispute DS 108) . 5 Under the Foreign Sales Corporations scheme, US companies were able to receive a reduction in US federal income taxes for profi ts derived from exports through the use of offshore subsidiaries, so called "Foreign Sales Corporations" (FSC). The WTO ruled that the FSC scheme constituted prohibited Table 1 ).
10
Most importantly, the Panel found that the United States causes serious prejudice to the interests of the EU.
11 The effects of the FSC/ETI subsidies were signifi cant price suppression, signifi cant lost sales and displacement and impedance of exports from third country markets (with respect to the 100-200 seat single-aisle as well the 300-400 seat wide-body LCA product market). This is important as subsides have to be "specifi c" and cause "serious prejudice" in order to be actionable under WTO law. Nevertheless, the Panel refrained from making any new recommendations regarding the FSC/ETI regimes. 12 The Panel decided that the recommendations of the old Foreign Sales Corporation case DS 108 -i.e. a withdrawal without delay -would remain operative, but that the measures in force at the time of the Panel's establishment had been changed during the course of the proceedings.
13 The latter reveals a major weakness of WTO law: there is no retroactivity in world trade law and Panel recommendations can be circumvented by modifying the challenged measures during the proceedings (although the subsidisation might still exist in a different, not yet challenged way).
US Department of Defence and NASA
Military programmes themselves are not subject to WTO rules, but can provide a temptation to hide subsidies. Finding proof is diffi cult as new military technologies can be partially used in the large civil aircraft sector, so called "dual-use" technologies. A close link between civil and military aviation results from the fact that the dominant military aircraft manufacturers in both the USA and the EU also dominate the production of civil aircraft. The synergy between the two areas provides for high technological value and economies of scale, since overhead and fi xed costs (as they occur in R&D) can be amortised more quickly. 14 Boeing's large civil aircraft (LCA) division received support from the US Department of Defence and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). NASA, for instance, granted direct fi nancial support as well as access to facilities, equipment and employees through the eight aeronautics R&D programmes. The WTO Panel found that the programmes at issue constituted specifi c subsidies within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 SCM, and estimated the amount of the subsidy to Boeing's LCA division to be US $2.6 billion over the period 1989-2006. 15 The Department of Defence (DoD) was also found to have provided specifi c subsidies to Boeing through 23 research, development, testing and evaluation programmes Aircraft Subsidies (RDT&E) . 16 Boeing benefi tted from the "dual-use" technologies, i.e. technologies applicable to both military and commercial aircraft. While the Panel did not accept the United States' estimate that the total amount of any DoD subsidy to Boeing for "dual use" R&D was signifi cantly less than US $308 million over the period 1991-2006, the amount of the subsidy to Boeing's LCA division remained unclear.
17
The EU originally claimed that Boeing benefi tted from the RDT&E programmes to the tune of US $2.379 billion. 18 Hence, the actual amount should lie between US $308 and 2,379 million.
Not all of the subsidies challenged by the EU were found to be specifi c, for instance payments that the Department of Commerce (DoC) made to joint ventures and consortia in which Boeing participated through the Advanced Technology Program. These DoC payments and the access to government facilities were found to be subsidies, but not spe- 
State Benefi ts
Not only the US Government and Federal Agencies were found to support The Boeing Company, but also the States in which Boeing manufactures its jetliners. The European Union challenged a broad variety of measures in the States of Washington, Kansas, Illinois, and municipalities therein. The Panel turned down part of the claims, but it found WTO-incompatible subsidies worth over US $500 million in the period 1989-2006. 26 Regarding the State of Kansas and municipalities therein, the Panel estimated the amount of subsidisation at US $475.8 million.
27 Certain property and sales tax abatements provided to Boeing pursuant to Industrial Revenue Bonds (IRBs) were determined to constitute specifi c subsidies in the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 SCM Agreement.
28
Subsidies worth US $11 million were found in the State of Illinois and municipalities therein (see Table 1 ). Support was provided in consideration of Boeing's decision to relocate its corporate headquarters to Chicago.
29 WTO-incompatible subsidies included certain reimbursements of Boeing's relocation expenses to Chicago provided for in the Corporate Headquarters Relocation Act (CHRA), as well as 15-year tax credits, and the abatement or refund of a portion of Boeing's property taxes provided for in the CHRA. 30 Classifi ed as specifi c subsidies were also an Employment Resource Center and tax rate reductions adopted by the City of Everett in connection with the location of the 787 assembly facility in Everett. 31 The Panel decided that the Washington B&O tax reductions caused serious prejudice to the European Communities' interests. It found a displacement of EU exports from third country markets, 32 signifi cant price suppression and signifi cant lost sales. 33 An immediate withdrawal of the measures causing adverse effects was recommended by the Panel.
34
The WTO's quantifi cation of the condemned Washington Business and Occupation tax reduction take only subsidies provided until 2006 into account, i.e. the Panel did not take into account any post-2006 subsidy amounts. The value of the benefi t to Boeing arising from the Washington B&O tax scheme is quantifi ed by the EU as US $2.12 billion over the period 2006-2024. 35 According to the EU, the overall benefi t from the Washington House Bill 2294 (which includes the B&O tax reduction) is estimated to be approximately US $3.56 billion over the period 2004-2024. 36 The EU sees its legal interpretation confi rmed as the Panel found adverse effects for the EU and recommended the immediate withdrawal of the measures. The EU expects the USA to withdraw the bill which will grant future benefi ts of up to US $3.56 billion to Boeing. The United States, of course, deny this view and the issue will be referred to the WTO Appellate Body.
Also contested during the appeal will be the evaluation of "serious prejudice" in the case of the other State subsidies. The Panel did not share the EU's view that the measures by the States of Kansas, Illinois, and municipalities therein described above would cause serious prejudice through their effects on Boeing's LCA pricing behaviour. The EU subsequently appealed the Panel's interpretation of adverse effects. 
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Bilateral Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft
With the fi ling of the suit against the European Union and Airbus in 2004, the USA had also terminated a bilateral agreement on support for European and US aircraft manufacturers. The EU-US "Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft" (TLCA) of 1992 regulated the permitted levels of state aid for the American and European producers of wide-body civil aircraft. 37 Direct government support was fi xed at a maximum of 33% of total development costs, and loans had to be provided with an interest rate covering at least the government's loan costs. Production subsidies were prohibited. Indirect state aid was limited to a maximum of 3% of the commercial aircraft industry's annual turnover, or to a maximum of 4% of each company's turnover in civil aviation. 38 Whether the 1992 TLCA would be applicable in the current Boeing case and whether the EU suffered serious prejudice from violations of the TLCA was not decided by the WTO Panel. The practice of Judicial Economy allows a Panel to refrain from making fi ndings when a measure is inconsistent with various provisions and other fi ndings of inconsistency would suffi ce to resolve the dispute. 
Outlook
The views on the Boeing Panel Report diverge substantially on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States and the European Union claimed a "sweeping" victory. Still, both parties appealed parts of the Panel Report in April 2011. The WTO Appellate Body will review the legal interpretations of the Boeing Panel, but will not re-examine existing evidence or examine new issues. A negotiated settlement between the two parties seems unlikely before the Appellate Body Report is issued in the Boeing case, i.e. 41 Reimbursable Launch Aids (RLA) are repayable, low-interest rate loans which were structured according to the provisions of the bilateral TLCA. They covered up to one third of the development costs of a new aircraft model. Part of the RLA was found to be actionable instead of prohibited, but to have caused adverse effects for the United States. The adverse effects and the amount of subsidisation, however, have been calculated neither by the Panel nor by the Appellate Body. In contrast, the Panel in the Boeing case quantifi ed the amount of WTO-incompatible subsidies to be at least US $5.3 billion. This fi gure does not include the future benefi ts from the condemned Washington State B&O tax reductions of up to US $3.56 billion (until 2024) and the Department of Defence support which lies between US $308 and 2,379 million.
The Appellate Body also reversed the fi ndings that French Government's transfer of shares in Dassault Aviation to Aérospatiale conferred a benefi t on Aérospatiale. Moreover, various research and technology development (R&TD) measures that had been included in the Panel Report were now found to have not caused serious prejudice to the USA -e.g. grants under the EC Framework Programmes, R&TD grants by French government, German grants from the "Luftfahrtforschungsprogramm", certain grants by Bavarian, Bremen, and Hamburg authorities, civil aircraft research and development and aeronautics research programmes by the UK government and the Spanish PROFIT Programme. 42 The Appellate Body also reversed the Panel's fi ndings of displacement in Brazil, Mexico, Singapore and Chinese Taipei, and of threat of displacement in India.
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trade battle for years or to reach an agreement and focus on the changing market environment. The battle for this market is not surprising, as global airline traffi c is expected to more than double by 2029, leading to a demand for up to 25,850 passenger and freight aircraft representing a market value of US $3.2 trillion.
2 It remains a strategic industry as not only the US Congress decision over the US $35 billion Air Force tanker tender showed. New competitors have entered the aviation sector and are being heavily subsidised by their national entities. As the duopoly is at stake in the long run, it seems surprising that the USA does not want to enter into negotiations for a bilateral or multilateral agreement on subsidies in the aviation sector. The USA had always claimed that it did not subsidise Boeing and expected WTO member states to follow WTO rules and not to grant illegal subsidies. This position seems somewhat weakened after the WTO Panel Report on Boeing subsidies. Whether it will lead to a rethinking in the United States and a new agreement in the aviation sector remains uncertain.
